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Ronald Dworkin insisted in Taking Rights Seriously that 
"[r]ules are applicable in an aU-or-nothing fashion."1 "This an-
or-nothing," he continued, 
is seen most plainly if we look at the way rules operate, not in 
law, but in some enterprise they dominate-a game, for ex-
ample. In baseball, a rule provides that if the batter has had 
three strikes, he is out. An official cannot consistently ac-
knowledge that this is an accurate statement of a baseball 
rule~ and decide that a batter who has had three strikes is not 
out. 
Although other themes of that work received some scholarly at-
tention, Dworkin's attempt to initiate a law and sports officiating 
movement fell flat. Interdisciplinary studies were the rage of the 
legal academy during the 1980s. Nevertheless, no law professor 
publicly maintained that lawyers could learn anything about the 
law from reading the collected works of Ron Luciano3 or 
watching ESPN. When Dworkin revised his theory of law in 
1986, he abandoned athletics altogether for the more ethereal 
pastures of law and literary interpretation.4 
Dworkin did have one potential disciple during the late 
1970s. As a young graduate student paying my way through 
school refereeing high school basketball, soccer and softball 
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games, I frequently thought about the relationships between law 
and sports officiating. Driving to and from my various officiat-
ing assignments, I mentally outlined the seminal article on the 
subject. The first part would be a devastating analysis clearly 
demonstrating that the great constitutional theorist Ronald 
Dworkin knew nothing about sports officiating. Unfortunately, 
the second part always proved more difficult. I could never 
think of any aspect of refereeing relevant to the study of the law. 
The project was soon abandoned. 
Several law review essays published during the early 1990s 
renewed my interest in law and sports officiating. John Hart Ely 
mentioned that he had often "thought about trying to elaborate 
the metaphor between constitutional interpretation and jazz im-
provisation."5 Ely failed to "writ[e] this up" only because "it was 
never clear what anyone was supposed to learn from it about ei-
ther constitutional theory or jazz."6 Unbeknownst to Ely, 
Sanford Levinson and Jack Balkin were writing a serious paper 
on law and music. Both Levinson and Balkin admitted that they 
were not "member[s] of the musicological scholarly community 
to which one ordinarily looks for 'authoritative' pronounce-
ments. "7 Still, they asked readers to consider: "Why would one 
believe that one must be an 'expert' in an area in order to have 
interesting things to say?"8 I was inspired by their article to re-
think my reluctance to inaugurate a law and sports officiating 
movement. If lawyers could learn from musicians, why not 
sports officials? Besides, unlike Levinson and Balkin, I might be 
regarded as a "suitably certified expert(]"9 in both disciplines I 
would be writing about. 
My original insight still seems correct. My experiences do-
ing more than one thousand little league, college intramural, 
middle school, high school and (rarely) college varsity games will 
not teach law professors anything new about the law, or at least 
about the legal questions law professors have traditionally asked. 
Nevertheless, an analysis of Dworkin's ill-fated foray into 
law and sports officiating may cast some light on the problems 
5. John Hart Ely, Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a 
World Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures, 11 Va. L. Rev. 833, 837 n.10 
(1991). 
6. ld. 
7. Sanford Levinson and J.M. Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597, 1602 (1991). 
8. ld. at 1602-03. 
9. ld. 
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that more numerous legal forays into other non-legal fields con-
front. Law professors writing essays on law and any other sub-
ject on which they are not "suitably certified experts" have re-
peated and will continue to repeat Dworkin's most salient 
mistakes. Casual legal interlopers into other disciplines risk 
making bald assertions that serious scholars in the non-legal field 
recognize as flatly wrong, if not downright silly. Scholarly 
mechanisms for identifying error, weak in academic law to begin 
with, are particularly weak when law reviews consider the merits 
of non-legal scholarly assertions. Casual legal interlopers into 
other disciplines also tend to rely uncritically on legal models to 
describe non-legal phenomena. Legal writing frequently as-
sumes that debates in other disciplines can be understood in 
terms of the categories that best describe legal debates. Relying 
exclusively on categories derived from the study of legal phe-
nomena, law professors may miss the most interesting features of 
their interdisciplinary subject, features which generate entirely 
different models of interpretation, evaluation, and decision 
making. 
Part I of this essay demonstrates that Dworkin fundamen-
tally misconceives the practice of sports officiating. Games are 
rarely as rule-bound as Taking Rights Seriously maintains. Both 
youth and major league umpires frequently rely on the sort of 
first principles that Dworkin claims should and do characterize 
legal decision making. Part II suggests that Dworkin's failings 
are rooted in more general problems with interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship. To the best of my knowledge, Dworkin did not 
practice or study sports officiating before writing Taking Rights 
Seriously. Moreover, that work was probably not reviewed by a 
"suitably certified expert" in sports officiating. Relying on gen-
eral intelligence alone, Dworkin failed to recognize that baseball 
umpires "interpret" the strike zone and other rules, relying on 
the general principle that teams should not gain "unfair advan-
tages." Taking Rights Seriously also never considers seriously 
whether, in light of the fundamental differences between judging 
and sports officiating, any model of interpretation drawn from 
legal experience could well capture how a sports official makes 
decisions. Part III briefly documents similar mistakes in inter-
disciplinary legal works that touch on political science, using as 
an example recent writings by Cass Sunstein. Part IV concludes 
that while law professors do not have to be "suitably certified 
experts" to have "interesting things to say" about non-legal 
subjects, interdisciplinary legal scholarship requires more active 
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participation by "suitably certified experts." Law professors are 
unlikely to do the best interdisciplinary scholarship, but they can 
avoid the most egregious of Dworkin's errors. 
I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORTS OFFICIATING 
The rule that "if the batter has had thr-ee strikes, he is out" 
hardly demonstrates that baseball is more rule dominated than 
law. The constitution declares that government may not abridge 
the freedom of speech or impose cruel and unusual punishments. 
To paraphrase Dworkin on games, "A[] [judge] cannot consis-
tently acknowledge that this is an accurate statement of a [con-
stitutional] rule, and decide that [a law abridging the freedom of 
speech or imposing cruel and unusual punishments] is [constitu-
tional]."10 Little professional training would be necessary if all 
sports officials did was enforce the three-strike and similarly 
structured rules. My youngest daughter (age 9) could easily be 
trained to cry "yer out" every time a batter had three strikes or, 
for that matter, to rule against the government once an abridg-
ment of free speech had been demonstrated. The difficult deci-
sion is determining when a pitch is a strike or when a govern-
ment action has abridged the freedom of speech. 
The point Dworkin was trying to make about the distinction 
between baseball rules and legal principles would have been 
clearer had he used as his example the definition of the strike 
zone. "The strike zone," in professional baseball, is defined as 
"that area over home plate the upper limit of which is a horizon-
tal line at the midpoint between the top of the shoulders and the 
top of the uniform pants, and the lower limit is a line at the hol-
low beneath the knee cap."11 So understood, the strike zone 
seems to be a rule rather than a principle. The crucial feature of 
a rule is that its application consists solely of determining 
whether "the facts Jthe] rule stipulates" actually occurred in a 
particular instance.1 Assuming the batter has made no effort to 
hit the ball, the home plate umpire calls a pitch a strike if and 
only if the ball at some point entered the area set out in the defi-
nition of the strike zone. This seems to require only the ability 
to get the facts right. Much skill and professional training are 
10. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 24 (cited in note 1). 
11. Official Rules of Major League Baseball34 (Triumph Books, 1997). The provi-
sion adds that "[t)he strike zone shall be determined from the batter's stance as the bat-
ter is prepared to swing at a pitched ball." ld. 
12. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 24 (cited in note 1). 
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required to determine whether a sharply curving pitch thrown at 
over ninety miles an hour tipped the strike zone at some point. 
Still, the definition of the strike zone and similar provisions indi-
cate that umpiring decisions are almost always limited to deter-
mining whether the facts justify application of a generally agreed 
upon standard. 
Dworkin recognizes that legal rules play a substantial role in 
the law.13 The argument in Taking Rights Seriously is simply that 
while virtually all sports norms take the form of rules, important 
legal norms take the form of principles. Unlike the definition of 
the strike zone, the First Amendment's declaration that "Con-
gress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech" 
does not describe in any detail the set of facts that constitute an 
abridgement of speech rights. That constitutional norm would 
more closely resemble a sports rule if the Bill of Rights declared 
that "Congress shall make no law imposing a prior restraint on 
speech." The laws of baseball would more resemble constitu-
tional norms if the strike zone was defined as "the area in which 
the average professional player ought to be able to hit the aver-
age professional pitch." 
Rule dominated activities apparently differ from legal ac-
tivities in the following related ways. First, disputes in rule 
dominated activities are almost entirely over facts. Since every-
one shares a common understanding of the strike zone, contro-
versy over pitches is necessarily limited to disagreements over 
whether a pitch entered the strike zone at some point. While 
some disputes in law are entirely over historical facts, others are 
about what rule governs a particular set of facts, whether, for ex-
ample, the first amendment only prohibits prior restraints on 
speech. Second, all disputes in a rule dominated activity are re-
solvable once the relevant facts are established. When presented 
with an accurate slow motion replay of a particular pitch, all 
competent umpires should agree on the proper call. Disagree-
ment in these cases merely demonstrates a stubborn refusal to 
admit error. When disputes in law are over the substance of 
rules, establishing the relevant facts rarely ends the controversy. 
Litigants who agree on the content and probable consequences 
of a speech may nevertheless debate whether the speech is pro-
tected by the constitution. Third, a person officiating a rule 
dominated activity need not know anything about how or why 
the game is played. An umpire who knew very little about base-
13. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously at 25 (cited in note 1). 
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ball could do a professional job calling balls and strikes, as long 
as that person had excellent eyesight, memorized the definition 
of "strike," and had the courage not to flinch when the ball was 
pitched at high speeds. The good judge, however, must be im-
mersed in the social practices of the society in order to deter-
mine the proper weight to be given to various legal and constitu-
tional principles. 
A. SPORTING RULES AND PRINCIPLES 
The law of sports in books and in action belie Dworkin's un-
tutored assertion that games are more rule dominated than con-
stitutional law. High minded principles and technical rules exist 
side by side in the official rule books of most games as they do in 
legal codes and constitutions. Sports officials in practice apply 
provisions that seem to express principles in ways that Dworkin 
claims judges should and do apply apparent references to princi-
ples in legal codes. Indeed, sports officials often treat text that 
apparently expresses a rule in ways that Dworkin would have 
judges apply principles. 
Rule domination varies by game. Baseball and swimming 
are fairly rule-dominated. The provisions governing how various 
strokes must be executed, for example, refer to specific place-
ment of the swimmer's hands, feet and chest. "Both arms" of a 
swimmer in a butterfly race "must be brought forward over the 
water and pulled back simultaneously," and "[a]ll up and down 
movements of the legs and feet must be simultaneous. "14 Such 
central terms of baseball as "out" and "run" are also defined in 
ways suggesting that their application is a simple matter of laying 
the facts down next to the rule. Crucial "laws of soccer," how-
ever, use language far more suggestive of principles than rules. 
Law 11 states that "[a] player in an offside position is only pe-
nalised if ... he [or she] is ... interfering with play or interfering 
with an opponent or gaining an advantage by being in that posi-
tion."15 Law 5 declares that "[t]he referee ... allows play to con-
tinue when the team against which an offense has been commit-
ted will benefit from such an advantage."16 No fact specific 
definition of "interference" or "advantage" is provided. Many 
provisions in the basketball rule book similarly seem to evoke 
14. Montgomery County Swim League: Handbook 1998 at 61. 
15. Law 11, 1998 edition of the Laws of the Game, (visited July 11, 1999) 
<http://www.fifa.com/fifa!handbook!laws/ index.laws.html>. 
16. Law 5, Laws of the Games (cited in note 15). 
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general principles. The National Basketball Association (NBA) 
defines a "flagrant foul" as "unnecessary and/or excessive con-
tact committed by a player against an opponent. "17 This lan-
guage echoes Article I, Section 8's declaration that "[t)he Con-
gress shall have the Power ... [t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing 
Powers," and the ban on "excessive bail" found in the Eighth 
Amendment, both of which Dworkin probably thinks set out le-
gal principles rather than legal rules. The NBA also explicitly 
recognizes an "Elastic Power" vesting "[t)he officials" with "the 
power to make decisions on any point not specifically covered in 
the rules. "18 
The "elastic power" of basketball referees, the "advantage" 
provision in the laws of soccer, and other such declarations in the 
official laws of various sports do not seem mere shorthand for a 
more complex set of fact situations. The same or similar lan-
guage that Dworkin claims evokes principles in law is often 
found in the rules of various games. Would the First Amend-
ment have expressed a legal rule had the framers written, "Con-
gress shall not ... interfere with the freedom of speech"? 
Moreover, seeming references to principles in sports in practice 
function like principles rather than rules. Experienced referees 
dispute whether the advantage rule should be applied in an 
uncontested fact situation. Some referees I worked with would 
not call offsides unless an attempt was made to pass the ball to a 
player in an offsides position; others interpreted "interference" 
as requiring offsides to be called whenever a player in an offsides 
position was distracting a defender. Officials who knew very lit-
tle about soccer had great difficulty calling the offsides rule. 
Their ability to recite that text from memory did little to dispel 
the havoc their poor calls created. 
Referees and umpires also engage in interpretive-like be-
havior when applying what on their face seem to be clear rules. 
Good little league and adult softball league umpires frequently 
call pitches "strikes" that do not meet the rule book require-
ments. Most players in adult recreational softball teams want to 
swing the bat. By expanding the strike zone in certain situations, 
the umpire serves the real point of the game, which is to give 
players chances to get relive past athletic glories, real or (more 
17. Official Rules of the National Basketball Association 1998-99 at 18 (The Sport-
ing News, 1998). 
18. National Basketball Association Rules at 11 (cited in note 17). 
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often) imagined. The strike zone is often expanded in youth 
games when the umpire believes that following the letter of the 
law would result in so many walks that the game would be nei-
ther fun nor educational. The strike zone may be a bit wider for 
the pitcher who, in an effort to be accurate, is not pitching as fast 
as possible than for the pitcher who throws every pitch at maxi-
mum speed, not caring where the ball winds up. The strike zone 
in both games is thus interpreted in light of the more general 
reasons why adults play recreational softball and children play 
little league baseball. Persons who do understand the point of 
these activities will make poor officials. 
Major league umpires also do not engage in mere fact-
finding when calling balls and strikes. Pitchers and hitters know 
that the strike zone in the National League is different than the 
strike zone in the American League. 19 The supervisors of offi-
cials in both the American and National Le~ue recognize that 
" [ e ]very umpire has their own strike zone," or their own way 
to "handle[ ] the strike zone."21 These different interpretations 
of the strike zone reflect different understandings of baseball, 
not different understandings of the precise location of those 
parts of the body set out in the definition of strike. The inter-
pretable strike zone was particular evident when the broadcast-
ers declared that one of the keys to game four of the World Se-
ries was whether the pitcher for the New York Yankees, Andy 
Pettitte, would get the outside strike. Agreement existed on the 
location of Pettitte's crucial pitch. The question was whether 
that pitch would (or should) be called a strike. 
Many fans do complain about major league variations in the 
strike zone. One frequently hears demands that umpires should 
stop relying on personal interpretations of "strike" and just obey 
the rules. "[I]t is the duty of an umpire to enforce that [strike] 
zone," sports columnist Bill Lyon writes, "not to interpret it to 
suit his own particular notion and whim. "22 Similar complaints 
19. See Tom Krasovic, Padres find out firsthand AL strike zone, San Diego Union-
Tribune (Oct. 18, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library; Bill Brubaker,ln Postseason, 
Calls Are Going Against Umpires; Inconsistent Strike Zone is Among Complaints, Wash-
ington Post (Oct. 16, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library. 
20. Brubaker, Washington Post (cited in note 19). 
21. Joseph Duarte, Zoned Out; Ball; Strike inconsistency subjects umpires to major 
scrutiny, Houston Chronicle (Oct. 20, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library. 
22. Bill Lyon, It's time for the umpires to recognize rule on strike zone, Fort Worth 
Star-Telegram (Oct. 12, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Library. See Gerry Callahan, 
Moody Blues, 89 Sports Illustrated 43, 44 (Oct. 19, 1998), available in LEXIS, News Li-
brary, ("(a]nother cause for frustration is the umpires' belief that the strike zone is theirs 
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are made of judges. Lyon could have been paraphrasing Robert 
Bork's frequent insistence that "judges must consider themselves 
bound bX law that is independent of their own views of the de-
sirable." A central point of Dworkinian theory is that such 
complains are invalid, at least to the extent they deny that laws 
must be interpreted in light of some more general moral theory. 
Taking Rights Seriously never explains why Dworkin's interpre-
tative stance is invalid with respect to the strike zone, but valid 
with respect to the First Amendment. 
Law professors still sympathetic to Dworkin's account of 
sports officiating should grab their National Basketball Associa-
tion rules and head off to the nearest professional basketball 
game. Most rules are not enforced fully. Players take extra 
steps in order to make fancy passes or shots; illegal contact takes 
place on virtually every rebound. Some rules are enforced dif-
ferently for the stars than for journeymen players. Michael Jor-
dan may be allowed an extra shove or step that Luc Longley is 
quickly penalized for. These deviations from the law in books 
are rooted in more basic understandings of how basketball 
should be played and officiated. As veteran referee Earl Strom 
noted upon retirement, his "philosophy of officiating ... recog-
nizes that pro basketball is bigger than the rule book and ... of-
ficials need latitude to interpret the game." The point of refe-
reeing, he declared, is to prevent "unfair advantage," not to call 
every rule book violation the referee sees.24 
Indeed, at virtually all levels, from pee-wee ball to the pro-
fessional or college game, "basketball" is not played by the rules. 
Referees ignore conduct that seems clearly to be within the let-
ter of the prohibitions and may even penalize conduct that seems 
legal. My first mentor, Rocco Valvano, was fond of saying that a 
good referee is a little bit deaf and a little bit blind. Basketball, 
he observed, could be played only if the officials did not see eve-
rything or hear everything. Just as the surest way to upset a 
business is to follow all the rules to the letter, so the surest way 
for an official to ruin a game is to follow the rules religiously. 
The mark of a good official is not how well he sees the game or 
knows the rules, but his knowledge of when to "hear" the pro-
fanity mumbled by an angered coach or when to "see" the 
to interpret, as if it were an Impressionist painting"). 
23. Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law 5 
(Simon & Schuster Inc., 1990). 
24. Earl Strom, How to Call 'Em Like A Pro, 73 Sports Illustrated 124, 125 (Nov. 5, 
1990), available in LEXIS, News Library. 
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shoving taking place on the high post. 
Dworkin would certainly have been disabused of his notion 
that games are rule dominated had he ever sat in on one of the 
many meetings licensed officials are required to attend. Every 
local officiating board has an officer called the "interpreter." 
The interpreter of the high school basketball board in New Ha-
ven consistently spoke of "our Board's philosophy" (emphasis in 
original). Other occupants of that office used similar phrases to 
describe a referee's orientation to the rules. The central point of 
every meeting was that rules should be enforced so that neither 
team could gain an unfair advantage. Far more time was spent 
discussing and debating what constituted an unfair advantage 
than precise fact situations. Disputes existed between and within 
boards over how certain rules should be interpreted. Basketball 
officials in Long Island believed that teams gained an unfair ad-
vantage whenever an offensive player stayed in the three second 
lane for more than three seconds; basketball officials in Con-
necticut believed that teams gained an unfair advantage only 
when that offensive player had the ball or was seeking to gain 
the ball. The debates over the merits of strict versus loose con-
struction of the laws of basketball that take place in the bars of-
ficials hang out in after games are much the same as the ones in 
the law reviews. 
Dworkin was unaware of all these aspects of sports offici-
ating when he wrote Taking Rights Seriously. Most games, from 
little league baseball to professional basketball, would neither be 
as fun nor as recreational if sports officials understood their re-
sponsibilities as enforcing rules rather than as preventing teams 
from gaining unfair advantages in ways not intended by the laws 
of the game. Taking Rights Seriously may have important things 
to say about how legal judges ought to make decisions. After 
publishing that work, Dworkin was invited to occupy numerous 
prestigious legal chairs and give many prestigious legal lectures. 
To the best of my knowledge, however, he was never asked to 
referee a major league (or even an amateur) sporting event. 
II. LAW, SPORTS OFFICIATING AND OTHER 
INTERDISCIPLINARY LEGAL STUDIES 
The merits of Dworkin's theory of judging do not depend 
on his evaluation of sports officiating. Differences between the 
purpose of various games and national constitutions may war-
rant treating similar language as expressing a rule for one en-
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deavor and a principle for the other. Whether "Congress shall 
make no law abridging the freedom of the speech" should be in-
terpreted as stating a legal rule or legal principle does not intui-
tively depend on whether "a player in an offsides position is only 
penalized if he or she is interfering with play" should be inter-
preted as a soccer rule or soccer principle. If the best under-
standing of the practice of law requires treating certain text as 
expressing a general principle, then legal practices should not be 
altered merely because the best understanding of some other 
practice might justify treating an analogous text as expressing a 
rule. 
Specific orientations in one enterprise do not entail any spe-
cific orientation in the other. Some lawyer/sports officials may 
think ambiguous texts or practices should be regarded as ex-
pressing rules for games but principles for law. I tried to adhere 
to the rule book definition of "strike" because I believed having 
all umpires treat the relevant provision as a rule would best en-
sure that the pitch I called a strike in New Haven on Monday 
was also called a strike in Bridgeport on Monday and in New 
Haven on Thursday. Supreme Court decisions, however, being 
made as a group, will be relatively consistent even if each Justice 
interprets ambiguous text as expressing principles, as long as 
each Justice applies those principles consistently. Dworkinian 
forms of interpretation will mean that the Unit~d States Su-
preme Court in 1999 may not interpret the constitution in the 
way that text was interpreted in 1899 or in the way the Israeli 
Supreme Court in 1999 interprets identical text in the Israeli 
constitution. These inconsistencies strike me as less damaging to 
constitutionalism than inconsistencies from game to game in the 
strike zone are to the enterprise of baseball. Nevertheless, an-
other lawyer/sports official might think that the game of baseball 
would be fairer and more interesting to spectators if some games 
were officiated by hitter's umpires and others by pitcher's um-
pires, but that rule of law considerations require that the mean-
ing of the Eighth Amendment not vary over time. In short, 
theories about how a good umpire should interpret the strike 
zone will not help scholars predict or determine how a good Su-
preme Court Justices should interpret the First Amendment. 
Taking Rights Seriously may demonstrate how lawyers 
sometimes gain valuable insights into the law even when they 
make erroneous comparisons with other professions. A scholar 
might develop insights into the ways in which lawyers counsel 
clients by comparing legal counseling to psychological counsel-
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ing, even if the scholar's conception of psychological counseling 
is wrong. That a scholar who began with a correct model of psy-
chological counseling would develop a better understanding of 
legal counseling than a scholar who worked from a faulty psy-
chological model is not entirely clear. Inspired by Persuasion 
and Healing, I might write a path breaking essay demonstrating 
that much of legal counseling serves to boost morale, a thesis 
that might in no way depend on whether Jerome and Julia Frank 
are correct when they claim most psychotherapies function by 
bolstering morale.25 For all we know, the inspiration for 
Dworkin's extraordinarily influential theory of legal judging may 
have been his wildly inaccurate characterization of sports offici-
ating. 
Still, Dworkin's foray into law and sports officiating offers 
cautionary lessons for law professors thinking about embarking 
on a similar expedition into other heavily charted fields. The 
most obvious lesson is that persons who write articles having 
only a casual acquaintance with their subject-matter are likely to 
make claims that are wrong, claims that no suitably certified ex-
pert in the field would take seriously. The more subtle lesson is 
that lawyers who write on interdisciplinary subjects will miss 
those unique features of their non-legal subject that might actu-
ally teach them something about the law, if all their work does is 
impose legal categories on non-legal subjects. 
The probability of error is particularly high when law pro-
fessors write on non-legal subjects. Their works are usually re-
viewed only by other law professors or law students. Not only 
was Dworkin not a "suitably certified expert" in sports officiat-
ing, but a good probability exists that no "suitably certified ex-
pert" in sports officiating read Taking Rights Seriously in manu-
script, reviewed that book for a press, or subsequently 
commented on that work in a scholarly or popular forum. Given 
the law review preference for bold theses and the tendency for 
other academic disciplines to recognize shades of gray, the qual-
ity of the non-legal scholarship in an essay submitted to a law re-
view may have little or even an inverse relationship to the prob-
ability of a publication offer. 
Law professors without substantial expertise in their inter-
disciplinary subject are prone to write pieces which resemble the 
book report Linus writes in You're a Good Man Charlie Brown, 
25. Jerome David Frank and Julia B. Frank, PersutJSion and Healing: A Compara-
tive Study of Psychotherapy (Johns Hopkins U. Press, 3d ed. 1993). 
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a report which after a thoughtful analysis of Robin Hood merely 
concludes that "Peter Rabbit was like that too." Dworkin as-
sumed that the model of law set out by legal positivists correctly 
described what a sports official did, and that the way judges un-
derstood legal rules could describe the way other authorities un-
derstood the rules of their activities. At no point in Taking 
Rights Seriously is there a hint that rules in some activities might 
be implemented and enforced in ways not captured by any ex-
tant model of legal behavior. As a result, Dworkin's belief that 
sports officials largely apply facts to preexisting rules is based on 
a failure to perceive fundamental differences in the way legal 
and sports norms are applied, differences that might have been 
obvious had Dworkin thought more seriously about the context 
in which sports norms are enforced. 
Justices decide controversies according to law, while sports 
officials are better understood as declaring how various laws ap-
ply to particular instances. Many differences between legal 
judging and sports officiating reflect this difference between ad-
judicatory and declarative functions. Judges make decisions 
only when a legal disagreement exists and at least one party pays 
the expenses necessary to bring the controversy to court. If the 
parties to a contract agree that each has performed their contrac-
tual obligations, the legal system does not get involved. Sports 
officials are far more proactive. The umpire declares whether 
every pitch is a strike. The umpire must verbally and physically 
call a pitch a strike even if every player and every fan agrees that 
the pitch was a strike. Indeed, umpires sometimes call pitches 
strikes when every player and fan thinks the pitch a ball, a situa-
tion which generally does not occur in law. Legal judges would 
behave more like sports officials if every time one party to a bar-
gain attempted to perform some contractual duty, a judge was 
always in place to rule "performed" or "unperformed." Sports 
officials would behave more like legal judges if, instead of 
standing behind home plate, the lead umpire had an office on 
the other side of town and only settled controversies between 
two teams when the aggrieved party was willing to hire a lawyer 
to present an appeal. 
Consider, for example, if the Paula Jones lawsuit against 
President Clinton had been resolved by a sports officiating 
model of enforcing laws. First, an official would have been in 
the hotel room, thus avoiding most of the evidentiary problems 
both sides faced when trying to prove their version of the facts. 
Second, the official would have immediately ruled "legal" or 
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"harassment," as well as instantly enforcing any penalty should 
harassment be found. This would have prevented all the uncer-
tainties the actual Jones litigation caused, and enabled the politi-
cal game to go on uninterrupted. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portant, Paula Jones would not have had to meet a very 
expensive "de facto counsel requirement" in order to have her 
day in court.26 Rather, an umpire would always be in place to 
penalize any powerful person who sought to take legal advan-
tage of a less powerful individual. Privacy (and expense) no 
doubt explain why judges do not hang around on every street 
corner (and in every hotel room), but had Dworkin done a seri-
ous comparison between legal judging and sports officiating he 
might have highlighted some of the costs a society pays for fore-
going this more intrusive model of law enforcement. 
This more serious study of how the rules of various games 
are enforced would also have revealed why sports officials make 
more fact decisions than legal judges-Supreme Court Justices, 
in particular. Most legal systems farm out controversial fact-
finding to other legal actors. Appellate judges frequently con-
centrate on controversies over legal rules because controversies 
over fact are expected to be resolved by the trial judge or jury. 
Sports officiating does not exhibit this division of labor. Base-
ball umpires are expected to resolve all controversies that arise 
in a game. In this respect, their balance of decisions more re-
flects that of trial judges in cases without juries than Supreme 
Court Justices who frequently sit in cases where the facts are 
stipulated. 
Dworkin was mistaken when he claimed "[r]ules are appli-
cable in an ali-or-nothing fashion." Police officers do not at-
tempt to resolve every crime. Studies suggest that police officers 
do not even pursue half the crimes they personally witness.27 
Prosecutors exhibit similar discretion, either failing to prosecute 
offenses or prosecuting a much lesser offense than the facts 
might warrant. If appellate judges tend to apply rules in an aU-
or-nothing fashion, the reason may well be that the legal system 
avoids problems that strict enforcement of the rules would bring 
by vesting the necessary discretion in non-judicial law enforcers. 
26. On the "de facto counsel" requirement, see Susan E. Lawrence, The Poor in 
Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making (Princeton U. 
Press, 1990). 
27. See generally Albert J. Reiss, Jr., The Police and the Public (Yale U. Press, 
1971); Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 Yale L.J. 543 (1960). 
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Sports officials, by comparison, combine the function of police 
officer, prosecutor, witness, jury, and judge, in a system where 
there is very little meaningful appeal. A good sports official 
must be "a little bit blind and a little bit deaf" for the same rea-
son a good police officer should exhibit those virtues, but per-
haps not a good Supreme Court Justice. 
The virtue of interdisciplinary studies is closely related to 
the virtue of comparative studies. By recognizing how different 
societies and enterprises organize various activities, scholars may 
gain much needed perspectives on their own societies and activi-
ties. Lawyers may learn that the American legal system is not 
the only way to enforce laws, better appreciate the reasons why 
legal judges behave differently than sports officials, and even 
gain insights that may enable legal models to acquire some of the 
benefits of the sports officiating approach to rules. None of 
these advantages can be realized, however, if interdisciplinary 
studies follow the model set out in Taking Rights Seriously and 
merely slap legal categories on non-legal subjects. 
Ill. REPEATING DWORKIN'S MISTAKES 
How pervasive Dworkin-like mistakes are in interdiscipli-
nary legal scholarship is impossible for one person to assess. No 
one is a "suitably certified expert" in all the fields that law pro-
fessors have invaded in recent years. The best I can do in most 
cases is report that friends who are suitably certified experts in 
various fields are rarely impressed by the quality of legal schol-
arship that trenches on their area of expertise, and comment a 
bit on a recent foray into my purported area of expertise, politi-
cal science. 
In the prestigious "Foreword" to the 1996 Harvard Law 
Review, Cass Sunstein distinguishes his approach to judicial re-
view from that previously advocated by Alexander Bickel partly 
by asserting that "Bickel's belief in 'prudence' was based on a 
generalized fear of political backlash, and not on social scientific 
evidence."28 Citing Gerald Rosenberg's The Hollow Hope, Sun-
stein proclaims " [ w ]e now know that it may be counterproduc-
tive for the Court to insist on social reform even if the Court is 
right."29 Later in the essay, Sunstein cites Rosenberg for the 
28. Cass R. Sunstein, Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 8 
n.8 (1996). 
29. Id. 
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propositions that "[t]he Court may not produce social reform 
even when it seeks to do so," and that the court "may instead ac-
tivate forces of opposition and demobilize the political actors 
that it favors."30 Law professors may question whether "Bickel's 
belief in 'prudence' was based on a generalized fear of political 
backlash" or on the political events Bickel personally witnessed 
during the 1950s and 1960s.31 Political scientists, on the other 
hand, will recognize the extraordinarily primitive characteriza-
tion of the social science evidence that Sunstein thinks supports 
his notion of judicial minimalism. 
Sunstein is wrong to think that social science evidence of the 
sort Rosenberg presents was not available to Bickel. As Rosen-
berg acknowledges in his introduction, his model of the Con-
strained Court is "well-established" both "functional[ly] and his-
torical[ly]."32 To a good degree, The Hollow Hope compares the 
traditional social science understanding that the Supreme Court 
plays only a limited role in American politics33 with the tradi-
tional legal view that the Court can create dramatic legal change, 
with traditional social science by and large emerging victorious. 
Rosenberg reports that his findings are treated with s~pticism in 
law schools, but that the more common response among political 
scientists has been "what's new."34 
Sunstein also relies on a substantially over-simplified ver-
sion of the Rosenberg thesis. Rosenberg does believe that "the 
Court may not produce social reform even when it seeks to do 
so,"35 but this weak claim standing alone would hardly justify the 
importance of The Hollow Hope. Much of the originality of that 
work lies in the various conditions Rosenberg claims explain and 
predict the (numerous) circumstances when litigation campaigns 
do not produce much social change and the (relatively rare) cir-
30. ld. at 33. 
31. For discussions of the political backlash to judicial decisions in cases concerning 
segregation and the rights of alleged Communists, see Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Raciol 
Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 Va. L. Rev. 7 (1994); Walter F. Murphy, Con-
gress and the Coun: A Case Study in the American Political Process (U. of Chicago Press, 
1962). 
32. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Sociol 
Change? 3 (U. of Chicago Press, 1991). 
33. See, e.g., Robert G. McOoskey, The American Supreme Coun (revised by 
Sanford Levinson) (U. of Chicago Press, 2d ed. 1994). 
34. Gerald N. Rosenberg, Hollow Hopes and Other Aspirations: A Reply to Feeley 
and McCann, 17 L. & Soc. Inquiry 761,764, TI6 (1992). 
35. See Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 336 (cited in note 32) (noting "the mostly 
disappointing results of attempts to use the courts to produce significant social reform"). 
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cumstances when they do.36 These conditions play no explicit 
role in Sunstein's analysis, have little to do with judicial mini-
malism in general, and often suggest different conclusions in par-
ticular cases than those Sunstein reaches. Rosenberg suggests 
that judicial decisions may create much social change if they can 
be implemented by private market forces.37 This claim might jus-
tify broad judicial decisions protecting commercial advertising, 
but Sunstein advocates judicial minimalism in that area of consti-
tutionallaw.38 Sunstein supportsjudicial decisions expanding the 
rights of women, even though Rosenberg has a chapter claiming 
that such cases have done virtually nothing to improve gender 
equality.39 Sunstein does not support judicial activism in welfare 
rights cases, even though some social scientists have found that 
judicial decisions J?rotecting the poor have had a significant and 
beneficial impact. 
Finally, Sunstein betrays no awareness that Rosenberg's 
findings are controversial. The Hollow Hope is an extremely 
important work within political science, but not the last word. 
Some scholars claim that Rosenberg's data are wrong,41 and oth-
ers claim that litigation campaigns have had positive effects on 
social reform that Rosenberg missed.42 My study of abortion 
found that backlash occurred whenever pro-choice forces won 
victories in any forum.43 Hence, contrary to Sunstein's claim, 
backlash is not uniquely associated with litigation campaigns.44 
Rosenberg has responded to some of these criticisms, and the 
36. Id. at 35-36. 
37. Id. at 195-201. 
38. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided at 82-86 (cited in note 29). 
39. Compare Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided at 72-79 (cited in note 29) with 
Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope at 202-65 (cited in note 32). 
40. Compare Cass R. Sunstein, The Panial Constitution 138-39 (Harvard U. Press, 
1993) with Mark A. Graber, The Clinronijication of American Law: Abortion, Welfare, 
and Liberal Constitutional Theory, 58 Ohio St. L.J. 731, 787-88 (1997) (citing numerous 
empirical studies of the impact of judicial decisions on the poor). 
41. Roy B. Flemming, John Bohte, and B. Dan Wood, One Voice Among Many: 
The Supreme Coun's Influence on Anenriveness to Issues in the United States, 1947-92, 41 
Am. J. of Pol. Sci.1224,1229-30 (1997). 
42. Michael W. McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity and the Politics of Legal Mo-
bilization (U. of Chicago Press, 1994); R. Shep Melnick, Between the Lines: Interpreting 
Welfare Rights (Brookings Institution, 1994); Mark A. Graber, Rethinking Abonion: 
Equal Choice, the Constitution, and Reproductive Politics (Princeton U. Press, 1996). 
43. Graber, Rethinking Abortion at 125-26 (cited in note 42). 
44. Do the backlash elections of 1874 (against Reconstruction), 1938 (against the 
New Deal), and 1966 (against the Great Society), indicate that reformers ought to avoid 
major legislation or constitutional amendments? Does the failure of the Populist move-
ment demonstrate that progressives should not rely on mass movements to achieve social 
change? 
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debate goes on.45 The important point is that the influence of ju-
dicial review on social reform is contested in political science and 
every political scientist knows that. No serious social scientist 
would base a theory of the judicial function on The Hollow Hope 
without incorporating the conditions of judicial efficacy set out 
in that work or without at least acknowledging some of the criti-
cisms that have been made of Rosenberg's claims. 
Sunstein has improved upon Dworkin in that he has at least 
read, perhaps too superficially, a major work in his non-legal 
field. Had "Leaving Things Undecided" simply reminded law-
yers that legal victories do not necessarily produce social change, 
Sunstein would have correctly stated social science wisdom. Nei-
ther The Hollow Hope in particular nor the political science lit-
erature on judicial capacity in general, however, provide strong 
support for Sunstein's normative agenda. Significantly, conven-
tional wisdom in social science also maintains that social change 
is hard to produce by any means, particularly in a society such as 
the United States where power is highly fragmented.46 Witness 
the limited success of the War on Poverty, which was largely 
fought on non-legal terrains. Unfortunately, rather than engage 
seriously with this social science literature on implementation or 
judicial capacity, Sunstein pronounced as authoritative one so-
cial science work and simplified that work's findings to fit con-
clusions reached on non-social science grounds. The result, to 
paraphrase all the relevant phrases, is "usable political science,"47 
"law-office political science,"48 or "political-science lite."49 
IV. RETHINKING "LAW AND X" STUDIES 
While the male leads in Gilbert and Sullivan's The Gondo-
liers originally claimed to be "against kings," they quickly em-
phasized that they meant to say only that they were "against bad 
kings." Similarly, when this essay inveighs against interdiscipli-
nary legal scholarship, I mean only to inveigh against bad inter-
45. The most recent development in the saga of Rosenberg versus his critics is 
David A. Schultz, ed., Leveraging rhe Law: Using rhe Couns ro Achieve Social Change 
(Peter Lang, 1998). 
46. The classic study here is Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implemen-
tation: How Grear Expectations in Washington are Dashed in Oakland (U. of California 
Press, 1973). 
47. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Usable Past, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 601 (1995). 
48. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and rhe Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. Ct. 
Rev. 119, 122. 
49. See MartinS. Flaherty, History 'Lire' in Modern American Consrirurionalism, 95 
Colum. L. Rev. 523 (1995). 
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disciplinary legal scholarship. Significant risks are associated 
with interdisciplinary scholarship of any sort, but boundary lines 
between disciplines are highly artificial and important questions 
will not be asked should all scholars stick too closely to the 
norms of their home field. 
Still, reason exists for thinking that law professors who do 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship are particularly likely to do 
bad interdisciplinary legal scholarship. The refereeing process in 
law reviews is much less likely than the refereeing process in 
other academic journals to catch factual and conceptual mis-
takes. A law professor who submits an essay on law and anthro-
pology to a law review is likely to have that essay reviewed by 
second and third year law students who may know nothing about 
anthropology. An anthropologist who submits an essay on law 
and anthropology to an anthropology journal is likely to have 
that essay reviewed either by other anthropologists recognized 
to know something about law or perhaps even by a law profes-
sor. More generally, different Ph.D. programs are likely to be 
more similar to each other than to J.D. programs. Ph.D. pro-
grams that train most of their students to become professors are 
likely to teach scholarly norms differently than J.D. programs 
that train most of their students to become practitio-
ner/advocates. All things being equal, therefore, a professor 
with a Ph.D. in one discipline is more likely than a professor with 
a J.D. to be aware of what must be done to meet or approximate 
the professional standards of another discipline. 
Nevertheless, Levinson and Balkin are right to maintain 
that one need not "be an 'expert' in an area in order to have in-
teresting things to say."50 Scholarly articles in one discipline fre-
quently cite scholarship in another as providing important in-
sights. Law professors have made numerous contributions to 
many non-legal fields, including Dworkin on political philoso-
phy, David Rabban on the history of free speech,51 and the nu-
merous contributions of the Wisconsin Law School to law and 
society.52 Still, as the example of Dworkin on sports officiating 
50. Levinson and Balkin, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1602-03 (cited in note 8). 
51. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in its Forgotten Years (Cambridge U. Press, 
1997). 
52. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead· Speculations on 
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974). Galanter is currently the John 
and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School. Levin-
son and Balkin are omitted from this list only because, having done graduate work in 
political science and philosophy, respectively, both qualify as "suitably qualified experts" 
in many of the non-legal fields in which they have produced important work. See 
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and Sunstein on political science suggest, merely being a very 
distinguished law professor does not guarantee that one will 
"have interesting things to say" about non-legal matters, except 
in the important sense that many people are interested in any-
thing certain celebrity academics say. The important question 
for serious interdisciplinary scholarship is how much expertise 
one needs "in order to have interesting things to say." 
Martin Flaherty suggests one standard when he insists that 
if for understandable reasons law professors cannot do original 
research in their chosen non-legal field, they should at least be 
"reading one or two dozen of the acknowledged leading books" 
or articles on their subject matter.53 Certainly Dworkin would 
have benefitted from better grounding in sports officiating and 
Sunstein from a fuller appreciation of the political science litera-
ture on judicial capacity and implementation. Still, the Flaherty 
standard needs supplementing. The best test of whether a per-
son has "interesting things to say" on an academic subject is 
whether many experts on that subject agree that what is being 
said is interesting. Law professors contemplating serious inter-
disciplinary scholarship should take the steps necessary to begin 
a real engagement with leading members of the non-legal disci-
pline. The American Political Science Association provides 
many conferences, journals and other sites for law professors to 
discover whether they have interesting things to say about politi-
cal science. Other disciplines provide similar fora that are al-
most always open to academic lawyers. Those scholars who 
have actively participated in these fora have produced important 
interdisciplinary work. Law professors who do not usually write 
nonsense. 
Ronald Dworkin's work on sports officiating and the law 
demonstrates the need for a greater cross-fertilization between 
persons doing interdisciplinary studies than has been the case. 
Instead of inviting members of other fields to write for law re-
views, law professors should consider first submitting their inter-
disciplinary work to journals in the other fields. Even if the 
work is rejected and eventually published in a law review, the 
comments will help law professors learn whether they have a suf-
ficient understanding of the field to make their comments aca-
demically interesting. Those of us in non-legal fields should take 
Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Faith (Princeton U. Press, 1988); J.M. Balkin, Cultural 
Software: A Theory of Ideology (Yale U. Press, 1998). 
53. MartinS. Flaherty, The Practice of Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1565, 1575 (1997). 
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advantage of invitations to publish in law reviews. While most 
non-legal academics have grave reservations about the quality of 
scholarship in law reviews, the blind review process also has 
flaws that may discourage bolder scholarship in favor of accurate 
descriptions of the insignificant. All participants to debates over 
legal matters will benefit from varying the types of journals they 
write for. Following the model established by Law & Social In-
quiry and the Law & Society Review, constitutional theorists 
might consider organizing or reorganizing a journal for academic 
lawyers and scholars in other fields who take the concerns of the 
others seriously. Articles might be reviewed for accuracy and 
originality by both lawyers and non-lawyers. As the true foun-
der of the "law and sports officiating movement," I would be 
called upon to validate any sports metaphor that a casual fan at-
tempted to slip into serious constitutional theory. 
